

" Long and various experience seems to have convinced the nations of Europe, that nothing but a standing army can oppose a standing army, where the numbers on each side bear any moderate proportion to one another. What effects upon the civil condition of the country may be looked for from a general diffusion of the military character, becomes an inquiry of great importance and delicacy. To me it appears doubtful whether any government can be long secure, where the people are acquainted with the use of arms, and accustomed to resort to them. Every faction will find itself at the head of an army; every disgust will excite commotion, and every commotion become a civil war. Nothing, perhaps, can govern a nation of armed citizens but that which governs an army—despotism."—PALEY.

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LONDON COMMON COUNCIL.

On Tuesday, the 19th instant, a Common Council was held in the City of London, and was very numerously attended.—To pass a vote of thanks to Mr. Addington, the late Prime Minister, was the purpose for which the Common Council was assembled, which vote of thanks had originated with Mr. ALDERMAN PERRING, who, when the proper time came, rose and addressed the court at some length, wherein he expatiated on the evils of the late war, and the gratitude they ought to feel to Mr. Addington, for accepting the responsible situation he held at so perilous a crisis, and making peace on fair and equitable terms, which was so much desired by the nation. He then stated, that although not distinguished by the eminent abilities of some statesmen, he had, on all occasions, most zealously exerted himself, and particularly distinguished himself for his economy of the public money, and his regard to our excellent constitution, and the liberties of the people, and also remarked, that he had put the nation into a state of defence, which rendered it perfectly secure from present danger. He then moved—" That the thanks of this Court be given to the Right Honourable Henry Addington, late Chancellor of his Majesty's Exchequer, for the patriotism and public spirit exemplified in his acceptance of that arduous situation, at a period the most eventful; and for his zealous and unwearied exertions in the public service; for his economical application of the national resources; and above all for that steady attachment to the principles of the constitution, and that uniform regard to the liberties of the people, which have so eminently distinguished his administration."—Mr. JACKS seconded the motion.—The question having been read, Mr. WATTHMAN made a most admirable reply, and called the attention of the court to three avowed objects of the motion. He

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said, no question ever introduced into that court, had been so heavily and dully supported, which he did not at all attribute to the want of ability in the gentlemen who brought it forward, who, he doubted not, would upon proper occasions display that ability they were thought to possess, but the question itself could not be supported by any precedent. The first avowed object of the motion, he stated, was the patriotism of Mr. Addington, in undertaking the administration at such a perilous crisis, this he combated with the most pointed strain of ridicule, and asked, if when they heard of Mr. Pitt's resignation, if any man in that court, or the nation, if he had been called upon to say who was likely to succeed him, would ever have thought of Mr. Addington! Could that court then commit such an absurdity as to thank a man who was not known as a statesman, for undertaking a situation of such importance at so perilous a time? In fact, he came in on the principle of exclusion, and as the declared enemy of the liberties of the people, so far as respected the Catholic question—the people of themselves provided spontaneously for the national safety, and he was not supported but as a minister on mere sufferance.—The next point was his economy—here he shewed that no enterprize of any glory having been undertaken or achieved, the expenses could not be so great when our whole operations were confined to defence; but he shewed that the taxes substituted for the income tax, were, so far as respected persons in trade, who were allowed an abatement of two-thirds, an unjust impost, as they paid so much above their fair proportion, and also in the late property tax no deduction whatever was allowed.—The third point was, his regard for the constitution and the liberties of the people. Here he stated that the income tax, and particularly the last duty on windows, which gave surveyors the right of entering our houses, were direct infringe-

ments on that constitution, and, in fact, was laying all the houses in the kingdom under an excise.—These were the avowed objects of the motion; but he contended, the real object or effect of the motion was a vote of censure on the administration which preceded it, and an implied charge of violating the constitution, and also an implied censure on the conduct of those members of Parliament who had lately so nobly exerted themselves towards forming a more efficient administration, as best calculated to call forth the energies of the nation, and preserve us from surrounding dangers. If these were the mover's motives, he disapproved of them, and thought it best to move a direct censure, and not to do it under colour of a vote of thanks to a third party. After a variety of forcible observations, Mr. Waithman moved, as an amendment, that all the words of the motion, except the word "That," should be omitted, and others substituted, which would then read thus:—"That
 "however this court may regard the good
 "intentions of his Majesty's late ministers,
 "it is their decided conviction, that the
 "extraordinary circumstances of the times
 "do imperiously require a strong, extend-
 "ed, and efficient administration, combin-
 "ing men of the first talent and considera-
 "tion in the country, they do therefore
 "highly approve of the conduct of the
 "Right Honourable Henry Addington in
 "resigning the important and responsible
 "situation which he held under his Majes-
 "ty's government, when he found he no
 "longer enjoyed that confidence and sup-
 "port, so essential towards conducting the
 "public affairs with energy and success.
 "They cannot at the same time but deeply
 "regret, that the late partial changes ef-
 "fected in his Majesty's councils, should
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CORN LAWS.

SIR,—The report of a committee of the Imperial Commons, upon the British Corn Laws, has reached our hands; and it is impossible to find another subject more vitally

interesting to the welfare of Ireland.—Upon the fair and equitable understanding of the terms, upon which the union of these islands was founded, we acknowledge that we should not have expected to see introduced into any public document, the term foreign, so frequently applied to this part of the empire. We did not think it strictly correct, that the kingdom and this kingdom should be exclusively applied to the Island of Great Britain, after a solemn act of the two legislatures of both islands had directed Great Britain and Ireland to be for ever united, component parts of one and the same kingdom. Of this solemn act of union, it is a fundamental article, that "all prohibitions and bounties on the export of articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture, of either country, to the other, shall cease and determine, and that the said articles shall be exported from one country to another, without duty or bounty on such exportation."—Upon this principle, a Committee of the Imperial Commons acted in March, 1802, when considering the subject of the corn trade between the two islands—"Whatever further measures or regulations," say they, "the wisdom of Parliament may ultimately adopt with regard to this important subject, in its various branches, your committee have greater reason to think, that it may be attended with beneficial consequences to both countries, if the liberty of exportation from the one to the other should be extended to both (for the propriety of the same rule is obvious) at the respective prices, for wheat, barley, rye, and oats, under which both legislatures, even when general prices were much lower than at this day, thought fit to exclude supply from foreign parts at the lowest duties"—Now by the proposed regulations, this price must be 40s. 8d. per barrel, before it can be permitted to us to import into British harbours. The necessity which shall raise the price to that amount, then will inevitably affect our market here, so as to raise the rate of wheat at our ports, above the exportation price. Thus, entirely shut out of market, either because the commodity is too high or too low, the result is obvious. Tillage will decline: no surplus will be, or can be on hand; and one bad season brings on a famine. If the five county farmers speculate on this calamity, and hope to get rich by our starvation—their policy is miserably short sighted. The policy is little better, which would restrict us in paying in the least variable of all modes in grain, for the very great quantity of British manufactures, hard and soft, which we bring into Ireland, in return for our corn. And miserable and vicious is

Upon the lands should into n, so ppire. at the exclu- itain, es of n and nent Of ental nties pro- y, to and from y or this Com- der- ween mea- down h re- ous rea- with s, if e to (for) at rye, even than pply — price n be har- the ably rate tion ket, n or will on fa- ate our ort ich pri- eat and arp in

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“ Corn Laws, which have hitherto been
“ enacted for the regulation of this part of
“ the United Kingdom, the industry, agri-
“ culture, wealth, and population of Ireland
“ have been steadily and uniformly advan-
“ cing to an high state of improvement.—Re-
“ solved, that it appears to us, that one of
“ the fundamental principles, upon which
“ the Union of Great Britain and Ireland
“ was effected, was that of a mutual inter-
“ course of trade, and such an equalization of
“ all prohibitions and bounties on the export
“ of articles, the growth, produce or manu-
“ facture of either country to the other, as
“ should render all commercial advantages,
“ resulting from such union, fully and sub-
“ stantially reciprocal in their effects. —
“ Resolved, that we have seen, with equal
“ alarm and astonishment, a report stated
“ to have been made by a Committee of
“ the Imperial Commons, upon the subject
“ of certain petitions presented to Parlia-
“ ment, by the farmers of five English coun-
“ ties, which report seems to be formed as
“ the ground-work of an act of the legisla-
“ ture, and recommends such an alteration
“ in the present subsisting Corn Laws as
“ would abolish the corn trade in this island

“ for ever; would, by such abolition, de-
“ prive its proprietors of the chief source of
“ their wealth, and its tenantry of the prin-
“ cipal inducement to the exertions of their
“ industry; and would produce the most
“ ruinous consequences of distrust, distra-
“ ction, and property, to the great bulk of
“ its inhabitants.—Resolved, that, in aggra-
“ vation of those evils, which appear to us
“ inevitably to attend the proposed altera-
“ tion, the disadvantageous state of the ex-
“ change between Great Britain and Ire-
“ land, the correction of which at present
“ occupies so deeply the wisdom of Parlia-
“ ment, would be vastly augmented.—Re-
“ solved, that we do hereby call upon our
“ representatives in the Imperial Parliament
“ firmly and unceasingly to resist a project,
“ by which, if carried into effect, the vital
“ interests of this country are threatened
“ with annihilation; and we do most
“ earnestly exhort every description amongst
“ the wealthy, the active, and the industrious
“ classes of our fellow subjects to oppose, by
“ every constitutional means, this most fatal
“ measure.” — By inserting the above in
the Political Register, you will, Sir, proba-
bly do great public good, and will certainly
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10th June, 1804.

CONSPIRACY AT PARIS.

Under this head have been inserted, in the Register, from time to time, all the official documents relative to the late conspiracy. There remain an account of the Trials to be inserted, and this account will be published as soon as we have authentic information as to the result of those trials. The following letters make a part of the documents; and, when the evidence given upon the trials come to be examined, the letter of Moreau will be found to be very important.

Letter from General Moreau to the First Consul, dated from the Temple, March the 7th, 1804.

It is now near a month since I have been detained as an accomplice of Georges and of Pichegru, and I am perhaps destined to appear before the Tribunals, and vindicate myself from the charge of conspiracy against the safety of the state and against its Chief Magistrate.—I was far from expecting that after having passed through the revolutions of the war, free from the slightest reproach of incivism or ambition (and more especially after having been at the head of great and victorious armies, which would have given me the means of

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“for ever; would, by such abolition, deprive its proprietors of the chief source of “their wealth, and its tenantry of the principal inducement to the exertions of their “industry; and would produce the most “ruinous consequences of distrust, distraction, and property, to the great bulk of “its inhabitants.—Resolved, that, in aggravation of those evils, which appear to us “inevitably to attend the proposed alteration, the disadvantageous state of the exchange between Great Britain and Ireland, the correction of which at present “occupies so deeply the wisdom of Parliament, would be vastly augmented.—Resolved, that we do hereby call upon our “representatives in the Imperial Parliament “firmly and unceasingly to resist a project, “by which, if carried into effect, the vital “interests of this country are threatened “with annihilation; and we do most “earnestly exhort every description amongst “the wealthy, the active, and the industrious “classes of our fellow subjects to oppose, by “every constitutional means, this most fatal “measure.”—By inserting the above in the Political Register, you will, Sir, probably do great public good, and will certainly much oblige your most humble and obedient servant.—T. B.—Dated Clonmel, 10th June, 1804.

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It is now near a month since I have been detained as an accomplice of Georges and of Pichegru, and I am perhaps destined to appear before the Tribunals, and vindicate myself from the charge of conspiracy against the safety of the state and against its Chief Magistrate.—I was far from expecting that after having passed through the revolutions of the war, free from the slightest reproach of incivism or ambition (and more especially after having been at the head of great and victorious armies, which would have given me the means of

satisfying such passions if I possessed them), that it would be at the moment when I was living a private life, only engaged with my family, and only seeing a very small circle of friends, that I could be accused of such an act of madness. I have no doubt but that my former connexion with General Pichegru has been the motive of my accusation.—Before I speak of my justification, permit me, General, to trace this connexion to its source, and I doubt not but you will be convinced, that the connexions which one may keep up with an old friend, and a man who has been formerly one's commander, however divided in opinion, and however attached to different parties, are far from being criminal.—General Pichegru took the command of the army of the North at the beginning of the second year of the republic. I had been then, for six months, a general of brigade, and sometimes discharged the functions of general of division. Pleased with some successes of mine, and with some military dispositions, he soon obtained for me that rank, the duties of which I at that time discharged.—In entering upon the campaign, he gave me the command of half the army, and confided to me the most important operations.—Two months before the end of the campaign, his ill health obliged him to absent himself from the army. The government then, upon his request, entrusted me to finish the conquest of Dutch Brabant and Guelderland. After the winter's campaign, which made us masters of the rest of Holland, he went to the army of the Upper Rhine, and marked me as his successor; and the National Convention entrusted me with the command which he then resigned. A year after, I replaced him at the army of the Rhine; he was called up to the Legislative Body, and our correspondence was no longer frequent.—In the short campaign of the 5th year, we took the papers belonging to the Etat Major of the enemy. They then brought me a quantity of papers, which General Desaix, who was then wounded, amused himself with reading. It appeared by this correspondence, that General Pichegru had been in correspondence with the French Princes. This discovery gave us much uneasiness, but to me more particularly. We agreed to let it rest in oblivion. Pichegru, in the Legislative Body, had less means of hurting the common cause, as peace was their ruin. I took precaution, however, for the safety of the army against that system of *espionage* which might have ruined it. The researches

that I made, and the decyphering of this correspondence, have placed all those pieces in the hands of several persons.—The events of the 18th Fructidor were then announced, and the public anxiety was very great: in consequence of which two officers, who were informed of this correspondence, prevailed upon me to inform the government of it, and gave me to understand that it had begun to be pretty public, and that at Strasburgh they were already preparing to inform the Directory of it.—I was a public functionary; and I could no longer keep silent; but without addressing myself directly to the government, I informed the Director, Barthelemy, confidentially, of it, begging of him, at the same time, to give me his advice, and informing him that those pieces, although undoubtedly authentic, could not be proved in a court of justice, as they were not signed, and mostly in cyphers.—My letter arrived in Paris a very short time after Citizen Barthelemy had been arrested; and the Directory, to whom it was sent, demanded from me the papers which it made mention of.—Pichegru then went to Cayenne, and from thence to Germany and England, without my having any correspondence with him. Some time after the peace with England, M. David, uncle to General Souhan (who had passed a year with him at the army of the North) informed me that General Pichegru was one of those banished in Fructidor, and that he was astonished at hearing that it was from my opposition alone, that you refused to permit his return to France. I replied to M. David, that so far from opposing his return, I should make it my business to solicit for him this permission. He shewed this letter to some persons, and I have learnt that the demand was positively made to you.—Some time after M. David wrote to me, “that he had applied to Pichegru to demand of you directly to be erased from the list; but that he had answered, that he would not make the demand unless he was certain that it would be complied with;” that moreover, he desired him to thank me for the answer I had given, and to assure me, that he had never supposed me capable of acting in the manner that was imputed to me; that he even knew, that in the affair of the correspondence of Klinglin, I had been placed in a most delicate situation. M. David wrote me three or four more unimportant letters on this subject. After his arrest, he wrote to me to take some steps in his favour. I was very sorry that the distance between me and the

government prevented me from giving some lights to your justice in this respect, and I do not doubt but it would have been easy to have removed that prejudice which had been given you upon this subject.—I no longer heard Pichegru spoken of, except indirectly, and by persons whom the war obliged to return to France. From that epoch to the present moment, during the two campaigns in Germany, and since the peace, there have been distant overtures made to me, to know whether it was possible to prevail on me to enter into correspondence with the French Princes. I considered these proposals so ridiculous, that I did not even make any answer.—As to the actual conspiracy, I can equally affirm, that I am far from having the least share in it. I confess even that I am at a loss to conceive how a handful of individuals, dispersed, could hope to change the face of the state, and to restore upon the throne a family that the combined efforts of all Europe, and of civil war, could not succeed in restoring, or how it can be supposed, that I could be so void of reason, as to join in such a plan, by which I should lose the whole fruit of my labours, which would only in such case draw upon me continual reproaches.—I repeat it to you, general, that whatever proposition was made to me I have rejected from opinion, and always considered it the greatest folly; and when it has been represented to me that the chances of the invasion of England were favourable to a change of government, I replied that the Senate was the authority round which all Frenchmen would unite, in case of troubles, and that I would be the first to obey its orders.—Such overtures made to me, an insulated individual (who had not chosen to preserve any connexion, either in the army, of which nine-tenths had served under my orders, or with any constituted authority) could obtain no other answer than a refusal.—The part of giving information to government was repugnant to my character, an office which is always judged of severely; it becomes odious, and marked with the seal of reprobation against the man who is guilty of it, with respect to persons to whom he owes gratitude, and with whom he has had long habits of friendship. Duty even may sometimes yield to the cry of public opinion.—This, General, is what I have to say as to my connexion with Pichegru; they will surely convince you that very false and hasty conclusions have been drawn from actions, which, though perhaps imprudent, were very far from being criminal; and, I have no

doubt, but if, by your authority, I had been asked for explanations on those points, which I would have very readily given, it would have saved you the regret of ordering my detention, and me the humiliation of being imprisoned, and perhaps obliged to go before the Tribunals and say that I am not a conspirator, and to appeal, in support of this vindication, to the uniform probity of my life for the last twenty-five years: and to the services which I have rendered to the country. I will not speak of those, General; I can say, they are not yet effaced from your memory; but I will recal to your recollection, that if ever the desire of taking part in the Government of France had been the aim of my ambition and of my services, the cover was open to me in the most advantageous manner before your return from Egypt—and surely you have not forgotten the disinterestedness with which I seconded you on the 18th of Brumaire. Enemies have kept us at a distance since that time. It is with much regret that I find myself compelled to speak of myself, or of my services, but at a time when I am accused of being the accomplice of those who only considered of acting under the guidance of England, perhaps I shall have to defend myself from the snares which that power may prepare against me. I have self-love enough to suppose that England may judge of the evil which I am still capable of doing her, by what I have already done.—If, General, I can gain your full attention, then I shall have no doubt of your justice.—I shall await your decision on my fate with the calm of innocence, but not without the uneasiness of seeing that those enemies which are always attracted by celebrity, have triumphed.

Letter from the Grand Judge to General Moreau, dated Paris, March the 18th, 1804; signed REGNIER.

I submitted your letter of this day, at eleven o'clock in the evening, to the First Consul. His heart has been powerfully affected by those measures of rigour which the safety of the state have imposed on him.—At your first examination, and when the conspiracy, and your connexion with it, were not denounced to the Constituted Authorities and to all France, he gave me instructions, if you desired it, immediately to introduce you to his presence. You might then have contributed to rescue the state from the danger which threatened it.—Before appealing ultimately to justice, I wished by a second examination to be fully assured whether there existed a possibility of separating your name from that odious affair. You did not, however,

afford me the means of following this line of conduct.—Now that juridical proceedings have been commenced, the laws determine that no document, whether in the way of accusation or exculpation, shall be withheld from the inspection of the judges; and the government has ordered me to add your letter to the other documents prepared.

PUBLIC PAPER.

Note, addressed by M. BACHER, French Chargé-d'Affaires at the Diet of Ratisbon, to the Diet, dated the 28th of May, 1804, a particular note, of the same tenor, having been addressed to each Court of the German Empire.

The undersigned, the French Chargé-d'Affaires, has the honour to transmit to the General Diet of the Germanic Empire, the annexed copy of the Decree of the Senate, which determines henceforth the style, the forms, and the transmissal of the supreme power in France, the only things which, in the organization of the Republican Government, did not bear a due proportion to the greatness and to the calls of the State.—He hastens, in these circumstances, to notify, conformably to the orders of his government, that his Imperial Majesty Napoleon, Emperor of the French, is invested by the laws of the State with the Imperial dignity, and that this title and this dignity are to be transmitted to his descendants in the male line direct; and in default of such issue, to the male line direct of their Imperial Highnesses Princes Joseph and Louis Buonaparté, brothers to the Emperor.—In making this notification, the undersigned thinks it necessary to remark, that all official communications are to be suspended until the former titles shall be replaced by those of the Imperial Protocol, as well in the credentials of the ministers accredited to France, as in those of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French accredited to Foreign Courts. The confidential communications necessary for the commencement and progress of business, may still be made in the usual manner.

“The undersigned is, in the mean-time, instructed to declare, that the important law which has completed the organization of the State in a manner suitable to the dignity of the French people, will produce no change in its political relations. France, in placing them under the protection of a government invested with greater splendor, and surrounded with a dignity more analogous to the nature of circumstances, confers greater force and consistency to the reciprocal advantages that friendly nations have a right to expect

from her; and, at the same time, she gives more consideration to the respect that all governments shall receive from her, and which they, in their turn, are bound to manifest towards her.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.


MILITARY PROJECT.—The history of the bill, for the execution of this project, was, in the preceding sheet, p. 941, brought down to the 11th instant. On Thursday, the 14th, the House went into a committee on the bill, read the clauses one by one, and the minister introduced several amendments. On Friday, the 15th, the report was brought up, and the amendments read a first time. Upon the question being put for reading the amendments a second time, a division took place: for the second reading 63, against it 69; leaving a majority of 6 against the minister. The House having resumed its deliberative capacity, it was moved by Mr. Grey, “that these amendments be taken “into consideration this day three months.” Mr. Richard Ryder, on the ministerial side, moved, by way of amendment, to leave out the words, “this day three months,” inserting in their stead, “Monday next.” Upon this, several speeches were made by the ministerial members, who were, however, unable to draw forth any answer from their opponents. At ten o'clock the House divided: for the amendment of Mr. Ryder, 214, against it, 186, leaving the minister a majority of 28. On Monday, the 18th, the amendments, together with some others now proposed by the minister, having been read and agreed to, a long debate took place upon the question, “that the bill, as amended, be “engrossed.” At five o'clock in the morning the House divided: for the question, 265, against it, 223; leaving the minister a majority of 42. This was the last division that took place upon the bill, in the lower House; for, on Tuesday, the question upon the third reading produced only a few observations: it was carried; the bill was passed, of course, and ordered to the Lords, where it may be expected to meet with great resistance, and may, one would hope, yet be prevented from becoming a law.—The only remaining topics, connected with this bill, that demand particular attention, are, 1. the clause introduced by Mr. Pitt, just before the debate on Monday, relative to the *army of reserve establishment in time of peace*; and, 2. the apprehensions, which, during the debate, some persons expressed, at the prospect of seeing *an extension of the standing army*.—With regard to the clause, if it be accurately described in the report of the de-

bate; that is, if the 74,000 men, who are to compose the army of reserve, are, the moment peace is concluded, to be *disembodied*, and only liable to be called out, at stated times, or in case of emergency; if this be so, and if the bill thus passes into a law, the project is completely changed; its main principles are abandoned; it is a thing both in substance and effect very different from what it was at first, and from what its author intended it should be. The preamble of the bill sets out with declaring, that "it is expedient that a *permanent* additional force should be established and maintained, &c." Mr. Pitt, when he opened the project to the House, dwelt with particular emphasis on the advantage of "having such a force *always* on foot," and triumphantly asked, what would be our situation in future "at the breaking out of a war." Why, said he, answering his question; "why, that we shall have, *ready at hand*, a perpetual and never-failing source of supply for our regular army." So strongly was this characteristic of the bill impressed on the minds of its supporters, that Mr. Spencer Stanhope seemed to regard it as the very thing of all others, which rendered the bill worthy of his approbation. "Any man," he said, "who had attended to the history of this country, must know, that a war generally begins upon our finances for one or two years, previous to our having a disciplined and disposable army; but, this plan was to enable us to *start with men, at the same time that we started with money*." Indeed, the whole frame of the bill proves, that it never was dreamt of to disembody the men during peace. No such thought ever entered into the head of the minister, till he was so hard pressed, that no expedient was to be neglected, by which half a dozen persons might be induced to vote for his measure, or rather, for his continuation in place. One obvious effect of this new clause will be, to counteract whatever may be done by the other parts of the bill with respect to the competition of bounties. The bounty given for the quota-men was, before the introduction of this clause, fixed at three-fourths of the sum allowed for recruiting the regular army; and, this bounty remains the same now that the clause is introduced, notwithstanding the quota-men, who are now enlisted, may, instead of constantly serving for the space of five years, be disembodied in the course of eight or nine months. The bounty to the quota men is not, indeed, positively increased by this new clause, but no one will deny, that, considering the chance of a diminution in the time of service, the

relative increase in the bounty is very great. Then, as to the motives for enlisting from the quota-corps into the army, one of them is almost entirely done away by this clause. To have four years, or four years and a half, *certain*, to serve is a long time: it is a great distance to look forward to, especially if a man be situated in a part of the country that he does not like, and whence, even with the impolitic restrictions of the bill, he might remove by enlisting into a battalion going abroad; but, lest such a motive should induce him to become a regular soldier, he is now told, that, when peace comes he shall be disembodied; and, as he can have little or no knowledge as to the moment when peace is likely to come, he will live in constant hope of its coming, and will, of course, have, from the cause here mentioned, no inclination to enter the regular army. Nor is it, as to this part of the subject, altogether unnecessary to consider what may, possibly, be the effect of always keeping in the heart of the country, under officers having no local connexion with them, a body of seventy-four thousand men in arms, who *must of necessity*, at all times be eager for peace without any reference whatever to the terms! The history of the whole world does not, one may safely affirm, afford a single instance of a body of men being placed in a similar situation. The officers are, it seems, to be placed on half-pay, during peace; but, how, in the name of common sense, can this be made to correspond with the *coupling* system, according to which the officers of both first and second battalion are to be considered as belonging to one regiment, and some of whom must, therefore, come, during peace, from full pay to half-pay, by way of advancement and promotion! Will any officer, who is worthy of commanding a corporal and six men, remain in a service thus clogged with impediments? What becomes, too, of all the fine-spun speculations about the "affection and family feeling," that was to arise and to be kept alive between the first and second battalions, just as between the nursery and the orchard, or the seed bed and the garden plot? This disembodiment scheme comes athwart the fraternal part of the project like an eastern blast athwart the loves of the plants. There is another circumstance attending this new clause, of which Mr. Pitt does not seem to have been aware. The quota-men are to be disembodied, in the same way that militia-men are, and are to be liable to be called out again as militia-men also are. But, in the first place, the officers are not, like militia officers, attached, by ties of home, pro-

perty, &c. to particular counties, so as to be at hand to come forth, without inconvenience, a month in the year, or whatever time they are required to come forth. The moment they are disembodied they will be scattered all over the kingdom; and, though they are to receive full pay while they are actually out, will a month's full pay in a year, or even three or four months, compensate for their being compelled to reside constantly in the kingdom, and to repair every year to the station to meet their men? And, if, by some means or other, the officers are to be found and brought to certain stations, where, in the name of wonder, will the men be found, when once they have been disembodied, especially if they are called on at the breaking out of a war? In the militia, indeed, there is a security for the re-appearance of the men; because, if the same men are not forth coming, others are balloted for; and, therefore, the parishes take care that as few as possible of their militia-men shall fail to repair to their rendezvous. There is no such, nor any other, security for the re-appearance of the men of the quota-corps, who, when once raised, are no longer a subject of concern with the parish, by whom they have been raised. These men will not, like militia-men, go home, almost a battalion in a body, to their several counties. They will be, like their officers, scattered all over the kingdom. The man who is to rendezvous in Surrey will be in Yorkshire, or Cornwall. If the scheme were practicable, which I am sure it is not, it would be truly amusing to contemplate the running backward and forward, the crossing to and again, the hying up and down, the swarming, that would take place in the country; and all this, apparently to answer no other earthly purpose than that of harassing and tormenting about seventy or eighty thousand men, and loading the parishes with about four or five thousand additional poor. There are laws against the migration of artisans and manufacturers, it is, therefore, not unreasonable to suppose, that the minister, seeing that those laws were proposed by him, would wish to prevent such migration; but, let any man duly reflect on what will be the feelings of the quota-men, when they shall be in daily expectation of being called on to resume their military duty, especially with the prospect of a war before them; and then let him say, whether any thing could have been devised so well calculated to produce that migration, which the government has been so anxious to prevent.—That

be added), should be introduced just previous to the commencement of the *last* discussion of the bill, with as little ceremony as if it were no more than a mere verbal correction, must appear utterly unaccountable to any one not acquainted with the manner in which Mr Pitt is influenced. When he went into the House of Commons on the Friday evening preceding, nothing was farther from his thoughts than the adoption of a clause like that, on which I have been commenting; but, after the proceedings of that night, he began to look about him for the means of securing his *majority*, in comparison to which the *measure* was a mere bagatelle. Thus it is that he has always been influenced, and has always acted. He is a minister of expedients, and not of principles. He lives from hand to mouth. He has never any general principle, never any basis, whereon to ground his measures of any sort. It is the same in every department: war, diplomacy, finance; every where his measures are calculated to meet the party exigency of the moment. The question with him never seems to be, "what effect will this measure have with regard to the honour and interest of the country?" but, "what a figure will it make in debate; how shall we divide; and what will be the effect as to the duration of my power?" When one reflects on this, the misfortunes and the disgrace, which have fallen upon us, within these twenty years, are no longer a subject of wonder. Under an influence like this we have been gradually sinking in the opinions of other nations, as well as in real weight and strength.—The other topic which, as being connected with the military project, I think, at this time, worthy of particular attention, is, on every account of very great importance, and, to do it justice, would require more time and much more talent than I have at command. Nevertheless, thinking it, as I do, a matter which should immediately come under public consideration, I hesitate not to bring it forward, and to submit my opinions thereon to my readers, being at all times willing to hear, and, if required, to publish, opinions of an opposite tendency.—That there should prevail in this country, and that there should be expressed by many members of Parliament, great apprehensions at any proposition for materially increasing the *standing army*, is by no means wonderful. Nor are the persons entertaining such apprehensions to be blamed: to entertain them is habitual in Englishmen: they arise from an attachment to real liberty; but certainly they are not so well founded now as they were at former



periods of our history.—Many gentlemen of the House of Commons did, in the course of the late debates, disapprove of the project of Mr. Pitt, because its direct tendency was to produce a decrease in the militia, at the same time that it produced an increase in the standing army. It would be easy to show, that there may be a considerable difference between a *regular* and a *standing* army, and, that Mr. Pitt's project, if not nullified in this respect by the new clause, would have produced all the dangers of the latter with very few, if any, of the advantages of the former. But, it is fair to allow, that, in expressing their apprehensions at the increase of the standing army, the gentlemen before alluded to, meant, indiscriminately, all soldiers officered and paid by the crown, and, to say the truth, they appear, some of them at least, to have had more particularly in view the regular army. Seeing that what Mr. Sheridan said upon the subject may be considered as a pretty fair specimen; as a summary of the reasons advanced by all those who seem to have entertained sentiments similar to his own, an extract from his speech may, on the present occasion, be sufficient. "As to the augmentation of our regular army," said he, "I cannot forbear to say, that I always look upon such augmentation with jealousy. I would not risk the liberties of the country by the enlargement of our standing army; and I am sorry to perceive, that gentlemen, whose opinions upon other matters I sincerely respect, should look so much, or rather, entirely to the extension of our regular army. If I were asked, whether I would not rather trust our defence in the field, against the attack of a foreign foe, to regular troops, I would immediately answer in the affirmative, still, however, keeping in view the compromise between difficulties, the necessity of securing our freedom against the influence and power of a large standing army. I would have our volunteers and militia aided by a due proportion of the regular army. The people of this country are competent to their own defence, and are ready to take the tone from those above them. They have regard for the high station which freemen may be supposed to feel; they have none of the slavish attachment to clans, but they look up to their superiors, and I use this word in its liberal sense—they look up to you, their superiors, with confidence, because you don't look down on them with insult. Give, then, to such a people proper example and encouragement, and you will not have any occasion

to look for a large standing army to defend your country. The people of England know the value of the objects for which they have to contend. They feel that, from the constitution of the society in which they live, there is nothing of honour, emolument, or wealth, which is not within the reach of a man of merit. The landlord, the shopkeeper, or mechanic must be sensible that he is contending not merely for what he possesses, but for every thing of importance the country contains; and I would call on the humblest peasant to put forth his endeavours in the national struggle to defend his son's title to the Great Seal of England. Acting upon this plan—employing proper means to animate the country, would render it unnecessary to hire an army to defend us or to resist any enemy. It is because I am satisfied of this fact—because I know that in this important conjuncture, which so strongly demands the valour of the brave, the vigour of the strong, the means of the wealthy, and the councils of the wise, we could obtain all that is requisite by operating judiciously upon the character of the people, that I object to the frequent call for an increase of our regular army, as I know that such increase must invest the executive government with a power dangerous to the existence of liberty. I object to it. I like an army of the people, because no people were ever found to commit a *felo de se* upon their own liberty; but I dislike a large standing army, because I never knew popular liberty in any state long to survive such an establishment. It is upon these grounds that I disapprove of the sentiments so often urged as to the augmentation of the regular army."—Before I proceed to an examination of these reasons, and to confront them with authorities and with facts, I must ask, without, however, any remains of resentment, what right Mr. Sheridan has to infer, as he not very indirectly does, that those who so often urge the necessity of augmenting our regular army, are not as sincerely attached to the people of England, and the *liberties* of the people of England, as he is? Mr. Windham has often, very often, urged the necessity of making an augmentation, and a very great augmentation, of our regular army, and that too at the expense of those irregular armed bodies, who are the objects of Mr. Sheridan's affection and confidence; and, is there a man in the kingdom who supposes, that Mr. Windham wishes to destroy, or to abridge, the liberties of England? Is there any body who

thinks that Mr. Windham is less the friend of his countrymen than Mr. Sheridan is? Will any one who happens to recollect the severe censure that Mr. Sheridan passed upon Mr. Windham for asking for twenty-four hours to think before he consented to an act subjecting the whole of the people of Ireland, not to the overawing power and influence of a large standing army, but to the operation of martial-law upon their own persons; who, that happens to recollect this circumstance, will, for a moment, believe, that the former of these gentlemen has more regard than the latter for the liberties of the people? And, as to myself, who have constantly urged, and whose object now is to urge, the necessity, in the present state of Europe, of making a very great addition to our regular army, and who have as constantly declared that I have no reliance at all upon any other species of force, what reason is there to suppose, that I should not be full as desirous as Mr. Sheridan is to preserve the liberties of Englishmen? I may be deceived, my opinions may be erroneous, my wishes, if carried into execution, might, possibly, endanger the liberties of the people; but it is altogether improbable, if not impossible, that I should have any *desire* to see a people, one of whom I am, and amongst whom I and my children must remain, degraded and enslaved. In the vast mass of writing that has grown together under my hand, Mr. Sheridan may, indeed, find, in repetition somewhat tiresome, perhaps, very high monarchical principles; but, if he, at the same time, finds me uniformly the enemy of oppression, individual or general, he cannot fairly deny that my principles do not proceed from a slavish propensity. It has, when in another country, often happened to me to be accused of slavish notions; but, in a few days afterwards, perhaps, I was the only man in the whole country who dared to expose an odious act of oppression; for, be it known to Mr. Sheridan that many such acts take place in countries where standing armies are held in godly abhorrence, and where what he calls "popular liberty" is enjoyed in its utmost perfection. He may, find, too, upon a reference to what I have committed to paper, that I have an inflexible enmity to democracy, and that my veneration for republican institutions of any kind is not very profound. But, this has arisen, he will perceive, not from a persuasion that those institutions are favourable to real liberty, but, on the contrary, from my being fully convinced that they are inimical thereto, while democracy, under the name of liberty, seldom fails, as far as my observation

and experience have gone, to produce the worst species of tyranny, tyranny exercised on the few in the name of the many, tyranny where the tyrant is unseen and the victim unpitied. Having said thus much, perhaps more than was necessary, in justification of my motives; having given this assurance, that no man is more decidedly an enemy than I am to whatever may be likely to abridge the liberty enjoyed in my country, I may ask Mr. Sheridan, or any body else, if he apprehends no danger to the liberties of the people from any other source than the crown? If the French flotilla were at sea, I much question whether our apprehensions from that quarter would not be greater than from any standing army that the King could have at his command. Now, I wish for something that will render us always safe in this respect, and that will, at the same time, not at all endanger our liberties from internal causes. The popular notions relative to a standing army had their birth in times very different indeed from the present. Our constant rival and enemy now says, and she has the power to make good her saying, that we shall be a military people, or that we shall be her slaves; and, complain as we may, cling to our ease and wealth as long as we will, we must yield to one or the other, we *must* make our choice, and that too without much delay. With those who deny the truth of this statement I, of course, am not arguing; but, with those who agree with me, that we must now possess a great military force, the only question to be determined is, of what sort that force ought to be, in order to obtain the greatest degree of efficiency with the smallest quantity of expense and the least danger to our political and, above all, our civil liberties. Here, by the passage which I am now about to quote entire from the sensible and profound writer whose celebrated work has furnished me with a motto, the reader will perceive, that I have followed an order of discussion already pointed out to me; and, indeed, that I have, by having recourse to this high authority, left myself very little to do but to apply to our present circumstances the principles here so ably laid down. "Long and various experience seems to have convinced the nations of Europe, that nothing but a standing army can oppose a standing army, where the numbers on each side bear any moderate proportion to one another. The first standing army that appeared in Europe after the fall of the Roman legion, was that which was erected in France by Charles VII. about the middle of the fifteenth century: and

" that the institution hath since become
 " general, can only be attributed to the su-
 " periority and success which are every
 " where observed to attend it. The truth
 " is, the closeness, regularity, and quick-
 " ness of their movements; the unreserved,
 " instantaneous, and almost mechanical
 " obedience to orders; the sense of per-
 " sonal honour, and the familiarity with
 " danger, which belong to a disciplined,
 " veteran, and embodied soldiery, give such
 " firmness and intrepidity to their approach,
 " such weight and execution to their at-
 " tack, as are not to be withstood by loose
 " ranks of occasional and newly levied
 " troops, who are liable by their inexperience
 " to disorder and confusion, and in
 " whom fear is constantly augmented by
 " novelty and surprise. It is possible that
 " a militia, with a great excess of numbers,
 " and a ready supply of recruits, may sus-
 " tain a defensive or a flying war against
 " regular troops: it is also true that any
 " service, which keeps soldiers for a while
 " together, and inures them by little and
 " little to the habits of war and the dangers
 " of action, transforms them in effect into
 " a standing army. But upon this plan it
 " may be necessary for almost a whole na-
 " tion to go out to war to repel an invader;
 " besides that, a people so unprepared must
 " always have the seat, and with it the
 " miseries of war, at home, being utterly
 " incapable of carrying their operations into
 " a foreign country. — From the acknow-
 " ledged superiority of standing armies, it
 " follows, not only that it is unsafe for a
 " nation to disband its regular troops, whilst
 " neighbouring kingdoms retain theirs; but
 " also, that regular troops provide for the
 " public service at the least possible ex-
 " pense. I suppose a certain quantity of
 " military strength to be necessary, and I
 " say that a standing army costs the com-
 " munity less than any other establishment
 " that presents to an enemy the same force.
 " The constant drudgery of low employ-
 " ments is not only incompatible with any
 " great degree of perfection or expertness
 " in the profession of a soldier, but the pro-
 " fession of a soldier almost always unfits
 " men for the business of regular occupa-
 " tions. Of three inhabitants of a village,
 " it is better that one should addict himself
 " entirely to arms, and the other two stay
 " constantly at home to cultivate the
 " ground, than that all three should mix
 " the avocations of the camp with the busi-
 " ness of husbandry. By the former ar-
 " rangement the country gains one com-
 " plete soldier, and two industrious husband-

" men; from the latter it receives three
 " raw militia-men, who are at the same
 " time three idle and profligate peasants."
 [I cannot refrain from breaking in here, to
 appeal to the farmers of England and Scot-
 land for the truth of this observation! If
 they were all to be now polled upon the
 question, is there one of the whole number,
 who would not say, take away one man en-
 tirely for the army, and leave us the two indus-
 trious peasants?] " It should be consider-
 " ed, also, that the emergencies for war
 " wait not for seasons. Where there is no
 " standing army ready for immediate ser-
 " vice, it may be necessary to call the reap-
 " er from the fields in harvest, or the
 " ploughman in seed time; and the provi-
 " sion of a whole year may perish by the
 " interruption of one month's labour. A
 " standing army, therefore, is not only a
 " more effectual, but a cheaper method of
 " providing for the public safety, than any
 " other, because it adds more than any other
 " to the common strength, and takes less
 " from that which composes the wealth of
 " a nation, its stock of productive industry.
 " — There is yet another distinction be-
 " tween standing armies and militias, which
 " deserves a more attentive consideration
 " than any that has been mentioned. When
 " the state relies for its defence upon a mi-
 " litia, it is necessary that arms be put into
 " the hands of the people at large. The
 " militia itself must be numerous" [one
 would think that he had seen our volunteers
 in embryo] " in proportion to the want or
 " inferiority of its discipline, and the im-
 " becilities or defects of its constitution.
 " Moreover, as such a militia must be sup-
 " plied by rotation, allotment, or some mode
 " of succession, whereby they who have
 " served for some time are supplied by fresh
 " draughts from the country, a much great-
 " er number will be instructed in the use
 " of arms, and will have been occasionally
 " embodied together, than are actually em-
 " ployed, or than are supposed to be want-
 " ed, at the same time. Now what effects
 " upon the civil condition of the country
 " may be looked for from this general dif-
 " fusion of the military character, becomes
 " an inquiry of great importance and deli-
 " cacy. To me it appears doubtful whe-
 " ther any government can be long secure,
 " where the people are acquainted with the
 " use of arms, and accustomed to resort to
 " them. Every faction will find itself at
 " the head of an army; every disgust will
 " excite commotion, and every commotion
 " become a civil war. Nothing, perhaps,
 " can govern a nation of armed citizens but

" that which governs an army—despotism.
 " I do not mean that a limited government
 " would become despotic by training up its
 " subjects to the knowledge and exercise of
 " arms, but that it would ere long be forced
 " to give way to despotism in some other
 " shape; and that the country would be
 " liable to what is even worse than a settled
 " and constitutional despotism—to perpet-
 " tual rebellions, and to perpetual revolu-
 " tions; to short and violent usurpations;
 " to the successive tyranny of governors,
 " rendered cruel and jealous by the danger
 " and instability of their situation.—
 " Whilst we describe, however, the advan-
 " tages of standing armies, we must not
 " conceal the danger. These properties of
 " their constitution—the soldiery being sepa-
 " rated in a great degree from the rest
 " of the community, their being closely
 " linked amongst themselves by habits of
 " society and subordination, and the depen-
 " dency of the whole chain upon the will
 " and favour of the prince—however essen-
 " tial they may be to the purposes for
 " which armies are kept up, give them an
 " aspect in nowise favourable to public li-
 " berty. The danger however is diminish-
 " ed by maintaining, upon all occasions,
 " as much alliance of interest, and as much
 " intercourse of sentiment, between the
 " military part of the nation and the other
 " orders of the people, as are consistent
 " with the union and discipline of an army.
 " For which purpose officers of the army,
 " upon whose disposition towards the com-
 " mon wealth a great deal may depend,
 " should be taken from the principal fami-
 " lies of the country, and at the same time
 " also be encouraged to establish in it fami-
 " lies of their own, as well as be admit-
 " ted to seats in the senate, to hereditary
 " distinctions, and to all the civil honours
 " and privileges that are compatible with
 " their profession: which circumstances of
 " connexion and situation will give them
 " such a share in the general rights of the
 " people, and so engage their inclinations
 " on the side of public liberty, as to afford
 " a reasonable security that they cannot be
 " bought, by any promises of personal
 " aggrandisement, to assist in the execution
 " of measures which might enslave their
 " posterity, their kindred, and their coun-
 " try."—Would not one almost think
 " that this wise politician and elegant writer
 " had, before he wrote the above passages,
 " received exact information of all that should
 " come to pass in this country for the last four-
 " teen years, particularly during the twelve
 " months which are just now drawing to a close?

As general principles have been supposed to
 be deeply connected with the opinions that
 men entertain and express upon the subject
 of a standing army, it may not be amiss to
 remind the reader, that PALEY has always
 been esteemed a *Whig*; that he has been, at
 times, treated with great severity for his sup-
 posed want of devotion to the kingly office;
 and that he is uniformly a zealous advocate
 for the general principles of freedom, and for
 the rights and liberties of the people. That
 he has not been a favourite with the dispen-
 sors of honours and emoluments his present
 situation amply evinces; for, who, having
 the least portion of liberality and justice in
 the composition of their mind, will deny,
 that the neglect he has experienced argues a
 profound want of gratitude on the part of
 that country, which has derived so much be-
 nefit and honour from his talents?—In ap-
 plying his principles to the circumstances in
 which we are now placed, I shall have no
 occasion to cite any proof of the superiority
 of a standing army in point of *efficiency*, that
 being a subject upon which no difference of
 opinion exists. In speaking of the disad-
 vantage of being unprepared, and, of course,
 becoming the seat of war, the case of an
 island like this would be an exception; but,
 if our country does not actually become the
 seat of war, it is not because our irregular
 levies are at all calculated to prevent it; and
 the other consequence of a state of unpre-
 paredness at the commencement of a war we
 feel in its full force, namely, the utter inca-
 pability of carrying our operations into a
 foreign country; upon which let it be ob-
 served and well remembered, that no nation
 ever did long preserve its independence in
 pursuing a system of warfare entirely defen-
 sive.—What has been cited respecting the
economy of a regular army needs only be
 read to be universally agreed to. We are at
 this moment exhibiting to the world a strik-
 ing and memorable proof of the truth of
 these opinions. The productive industry of
 the country is materially lessened, the habits
 of obedience in apprentices, servants, and
 children are weakened, idleness is daily ex-
 tending its baleful influence wider and wider,
 and there can be little doubt that the loss
 occasioned by the present multitudinous force,
 on which no man places much reliance, is
 three times at least as great as the sum that
 would be required to maintain a regular ar-
 my, the existence of which, while it left all
 the bonds of society unbroken and untouch-
 ed, would communicate to the mind of even
 the most timid an idea of perfect security,
 Nor must we, in speaking of the enormous
 expense and loss attendant upon our irregu-

lar levies, forget to observe the effect which a knowledge of our situation in this respect must have upon the enemy. Does he not well know that this system cannot be supported for any length of time? To say nothing here of the more dangerous consequences of the existence of armed bodies all over the countries, does not the enemy know that we are not, even for twenty-four hours at a time, certain that one half of them will not throw down their arms? While we are in this state will he ever fear us? Will he not constantly hope that some accident of the kind here mentioned, that weariness or mere whim amongst our voluntary corps may compel our Sovereign to fall at his feet and solicit peace on his own terms? How different would his opinion of us be, how immensely different would be our situation, if we had a regular army in the United Kingdom of only a hundred and fifty thousand men! How simple would be all our calculations and proceedings; how quiet and safe would be our state! Every one would then be in his place: the day would be spent in our proper occupations, and the night would afford us the blessings of repose, blessings which we cannot now be said to enjoy, and which we never shall enjoy, till our safety rests on something more secure than the precarious perseverance and obedience of occasional and undisciplined bodies of armed men. "Give the people," says Mr. Sheridan, "a proper example and encouragement and you will need no standing army." What example or what encouragement will remove the inconveniences which have been mentioned above, and which are at this moment universally felt through the country? In truth, though they may sound well, there is no meaning in such vague exhortations. And, as to the people's fighting bravely, because they have valuable property and possessions to defend, the opinion, though very fashionable, has been, and ever will be, contradicted by facts. Men who have something to fight for have something to live for, or something wherewith to purchase the preservation of their lives; and they are very apt (when not, like Scrub, too much frightened to say what they mean) to exclaim, "spare my life and take all I have." The humblest peasant's "shedding his blood in defence of his son's title to the Great Seal of England" must be regarded as a mere frolic of fancy. God forbid that the Great Seal should ever be consigned to such keeping! for, if ever it should, Mr. Sheridan may be assured, that both it and the Sovereign, of whose authority it is the representative, will very soon

cease to be objects of veneration, even in the eyes of that humblest peasant. To talk seriously of motives such as these, as operating in defence of a country against an invading enemy, is to discover an entire want of knowledge as to the nature of military force. This force, the force of an army, consists not in the individual strength and native courage of the men of whom it is composed. Soldiers are better indeed for being individually strong and valiant; but that strength and valour are useless without discipline. The force and execution of an army arise almost entirely from the habits and qualities that the men receive after they become soldiers. It is not their dressing to the right and left, their lifting up their legs and putting them down again like clock-work, their firing with as much regularity and harmony as musicians play; all these, the newspapers tell us, not very truly perhaps, the volunteers are as perfect in, as any regular regiment; but all these, though by no means unnecessary in the training of soldiers, will do little towards the defeat of an enemy. That which renders soldiers formidable, that which makes them perform deeds of renown, that which makes them meet death with so much unconcern is, that *constant habit of obedience*, which in a very short time so completely gets possession of the mind, that the very *thought* of disobeying never enters it. This it is that makes an army; this quality in the soldier puts into the absolute power of the commander, into his hand as it were, the strength, agility, and address, of every individual under his command. This enables him to order men on services of almost certain death. They go on such services, not because they like them, not because they have not (for in many instances they have) the power to disobey, but because they never think of disobeying; because, in their mind, disobedience is become a sort of impossibility. With this discipline twenty thousand men, though very poor in point of individual strength and courage, are in almost any situation more than a match for sixty thousand men, individually the most strong and courageous, without this discipline. To describe the people of this free and happy country, pouring forth from their shops and cottages to defend their possessions, their wives and their children, and even their children's "title to the Great Seal," makes a very pretty figure in an oration, and I do not say that such flourishes are altogether useless; but if Mr. Sheridan should ever see the people of a county thus pouring forth, and if he should unhappily see a for-

midable army of the enemy come amongst them, he will soon be convinced of the truths that I am now endeavouring to impress upon his mind. There is no doubt that the peasants of this country are brave: their forefathers were so, and, notwithstanding the incessant efforts of cant and effeminacy to eradicate every manly sentiment from their minds, the sons also are brave: but, when we talk of the peasants of a village defending their cottages, when we talk of the patriotism, loyalty, and paternal feelings of the peasant, we seem to forget what all these are to be opposed to, that it is to nothing less than that terrible thing called an army; for, if you will not allow that a hostile army can ever gain a footing in the country, then volunteer corps are, for purposes of defence, just as good as regular regiments. Subsidiary to a regular army peasants may do much; collected in little bands they may cut down trees, dig up roads, break down bridges, and, well covered by an army, may assist in annoying him in various other ways; but, as to meeting an invading enemy in the field, as to forming them into voluntary corps, battalions and brigades for the purpose of combating a disciplined army, the intention certainly is the most childish and the most wild that ever entered into the mind of man. — The danger which some persons apprehend, or affect to apprehend, to the liberties of the people, from a standing army, is the only point that remains to be considered. Mr. Sheridan says that he knows that “a great increase of the regular army must invest the executive government with powers dangerous to liberty,” and that he “never knew popular liberty long to survive such an establishment.” Exactly what he means by “popular liberty” it would not, perhaps, be very easy to find out. If it be such as was enjoyed in London for some few weeks in the year 1780, or such as that which I have above described as being, in effect, the most execrable tyranny, exercised upon the few in the name of the many, and for the gratification, perhaps, of some single petty despot; if Mr. Sheridan had either of these sorts of liberty in his view, I think it will be allowed, that the shorter its period of existence the better; and that if it could not be otherwise got rid of, it would be very well worth while to raise a standing army, and a very large one too, for the express purpose of putting an end to it. Supposing him to mean, that freedom from oppression, that real liberty which the people of a country enjoy by virtue of usage and law, I should be glad if he would point out the instances in which this sort of liberty has been destroy-

ed by the instrumentality or influence of a standing army: I know of none: and let history say whether, since the erection of standing armies in Europe, the liberties of the people have not been constantly upon the increase. There is no one, who compares the present state of the people with the state in which they were at the epoch to which PALEY refers us, that must not clearly perceive that standing armies have *not* been generally, if in any one instance, inimical to political and civil liberty. In our own country what mischiefs of this sort has a standing army produced? It was not till about the time of the revolution that England had a standing army to any amount. Since that time it has been gradually increasing; but will any one say that, except in cases connected with taxation, that the liberties of the people have been abridged? Will any one say that a diminution has taken place in the political and civil liberties of the people, and, if it has, will any one attempt to trace such diminution to the influence of the regular army? But, we are told that the influence of the regular army is counteracted by that of the militia. To keep different sorts of military force, all raised in the same country, as checks upon one another, is certainly the drollest idea that ever was conceived. It is the fashion to style the militia the “*constitutional force*” of the country, which most assuredly is to insinuate, that the regular army is an unconstitutional force. Since when, however, let me ask, has this constitutional force existed? Only about forty years: yet the country had just the same constitution before that it has now; and if by the word constitution be meant a certain code or scheme of government securing the poor as well as the rich from *acts of oppression*, then I shall insist that the constitution has gained nothing by the militia establishment, unless it be proved to me that it is just and equitable to demand as much military duty from a man who possesses not a shilling as from one who has an annual income of fifty-thousand pounds. These constitutional gentlemen are so anxiously stretching their eyes after the mischiefs that may arise, but which have never yet arisen, from a standing army, that they entirely overlook those which *do* arise from a system of militias, and which have, of late, been so cruelly felt by the people of this country. There may, to be sure, be peasants ready to “defend their son’s title to the Great Seal;” but I am the most deceived of mankind if there be one in the whole kingdom who would not wish for a standing army in order to secure himself and his sons from the burden and the constant dread of the effect of

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the militia system. Nay, I am certain, that ninety-nine hundredths of the people, if the question were fairly submitted to their consideration, would, without the least hesitation, decide in favour of a standing army sufficient for all the purposes of defence as well as of offence: for, in fact, what can be a greater mockery than to drag men from their homes by *force* to serve in a militia, in order to prevent the *risk* of having their *liberties abridged* by the influence of a standing army? Is it possible to conceive a grosser insult to common sense? There may, however, be dangers from the establishment of a large standing army, if its organization be such as completely to dis sever it from the rest of the community. PALEY allows, and every one will agree with him, that there may be such danger; but, in the first place, he asserts that the danger is much greater from an extended system of militias; and, what he would have said of a militia system where the men are not under martial law, where they may quit their corps when they please, and where every one keeps his arms in his own house; what he would have said of the dangers of such a system may easily be guessed. The least that we can do is to pray that our country may not, at some period not far distant, at a general election, for instance, or in a season of scarcity, furnish a practical illustration of those principles which he has so clearly and so forcibly laid down, and from which a wise government would have taken warning. In the organization of the British regular army as it now stands there is great security against any attempt, from that quarter, against the public liberty. An appeal to facts would prove, that, of the advocates of the rights of the people, the regular army has, at all times, furnished its full share; nor has the ministerial phalanx in Parliament ever been able to boast of possessing more than a fair proportion of the military members. Little, perhaps, remains to be done for the officers, except to augment the pay and to add to the civil rights of the subalterns; but, in extending the establishment so as to make it sufficient for all our military purposes, much, very much, must be done for the men. The opponents of this extension choose to conclude, upon what authority I know not, that we who are for the extension wish to have a standing army equal in number to all the different descriptions of armed men now in the nation; whereas we should be perfectly well satisfied, and so would the people too, with about a fourth part of that number, and probably with less. Not only would our army be disciplined, and, therefore, quite another thing than an

army consisting of militia and volunteer levies; but, it would, in a little time, be even better constituted than our regular army now is; and, at the same time that, by introducing into it a better class of men, we should give it, relatively as well as positively, a great addition of strength in the field, we should interweave its interests more closely with those of the people at large by giving it those civil rights and immunities to which it is justly entitled, and the withholding of which from it is the chief reason that we have not now an army. What! some constitutional gentlemen will exclaim, would you extend our civil rights and privileges to wretches who are picked up by crimps and collected from the police offices? to the youths "whose most opprobrious fame and clear convicted crimes have stamped them soldiers?" No: and you must be exceedingly perverse to affect to believe that we mean to have any such youths. We would have men of a quite different description; and in order to have them, we would make their situation respectable, and provide for them a comfortable and decent maintenance from the close of their services to the end of their lives. We would no longer have six or seven and thirty thousand distressed wretches, not a few of them wounded, lame, or blind, scattered over the country to terrify men from entering the army, and to tell the rising generation, that to discharge the duties of a soldier is not the road to honour, but, if it should not prove to be the road to death, it is sure to end in poverty and misery. No: this disgrace to the profession of arms should no longer exist. It no longer should be, as it now is, a saying amongst mothers, even in the very lowest walks of life, that they would sooner follow a son to the grave than see him enlisted in the army. *Money*, in the shape of pay, is not wanted. The soldier's pay, as long as he is able to serve, is quite sufficient at this time. It might be desirable to make an addition in certain cases; but generally speaking it is not money that is wanted while the man is in service. There is something other than money that the army wants and that it must have before it will be what it ought to be. The nation has a certain quantity of rights, immunities, and privileges to bestow, and, if it will not give the army a share of these, it never will have such an army as is now required. Some persons say, "why their pay is advanced, what do they want more?" They want to be put, as to civil privileges, upon a footing with their countrymen and kindred: and, however angry we may be with them for not being content

to merit the name of "mercenaries," which is sometimes most illiberally and unjustly applied to them, we may rest assured, that while the serving an apprenticeship of seven years to a vulgar and low occupation gives a man greater rights and privileges than he can obtain by serving thirty years in the army; while this is the case we may be well assured that very few will covet the honour of venturing their lives in the service of their country; and that, though some respectable young men will still enter, in spite of every discouragement, the number will be comparatively very small. From an army such as we would propose there would be no danger at all to the political and civil liberties of the country, because we would, or at least I would, give the soldier his full share of those liberties, always taking care that the exercise of them should never clash with his military duties, and with this view almost every thing I would confer on him should be conferred after the expiration of his constant military service. Can any man give me a reason, why, of two brothers, one who has been hammering a lap-stone for seven years should thereby acquire a right to vote for a representative of his borough, while the other who has been serving in the army seven years, and who has ventured his life perhaps twenty times, acquires no right at all, but in reality *loses* this part of his birth-right? Observe, too, that there is no law nor usage nor principle to prevent a man from voting for a member of parliament merely because such man is a soldier: if he has had the good fortune previously to have spent seven years of his life in making shoes or dressing hair he may vote notwithstanding he be a soldier; but if he has been a soldier from the moment he was able to carry a musket, he is totally and for ever excluded! I have selected this from amongst many of the disadvantages under which soldiers labour and which must be removed if we mean to have an efficient, economical, a safe and durable military system. I know that there are great obstacles to overcome: the covetousness and envy of trade; the insolence of mercantile wealth; and the mere habit of clamouring against a standing army will of itself do much: men do not reason nor will they for a long time listen to reason upon a subject like this; but, I am fully convinced, that, unless reason does, as to this matter, prevail, and that speedily too, the independence of this country is of no long duration. The state of Europe is altered.

France has said that no nation which is not military shall remain free; and, that to be a military nation requires a regular army is most amply and awfully proved by the fate of those nations who have attempted to resist her by occasional and voluntary levies.—The importance which I attach to this subject must be my apology for having taken up with it so much of the reader's time; and also for postponing to my next several topics which demanded immediate attention.

IRISH FINANCE. This topic, however, I cannot entirely pass over in silence, even for a few days. The new Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer has brought out his budget, imposing new taxes to the annual amount of twelve hundred thousand pounds. This is called a "strong measure," and it surely is; but, the taxes never will produce eight hundred thousand pounds, though they include a tax upon bank notes, which is, in that happy country, a most flourishing branch of manufacture. It is truly curious to hear the language, in which the partisans of the ministry indulge upon this subject: "From the report," says one of them, "of the business in the House of Commons yesterday, our readers will observe, that a strong measure has been adopted with regard to Ireland. What opinion is entertained of the conduct of the late Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer by the Irish gentlemen themselves is obvious. Certain it is, that the change in the government is no less beneficial to Ireland than to this country; perhaps a great deal more so. What must have been the consequence of a system of perpetual loans, which rose to such a height that the whole revenue of the country was almost swallowed up in paying the interest of the debt? What shall we say to the practice of allowing enormous balances to remain in the hands of collectors, by which means immense sums were lost to a revenue before too scanty? What shall we say to the silence that was maintained relative to the joint accounts? What shall we say to those who had the power of remedying these abuses, but did not, nor laid any account of them before Parliament? What might with justice be said, we leave the public to judge; but what we again do say is, that the late change in the administration was peculiarly fortunate for Ireland."—This man little imagines, that his shafts wound nobody but Mr. Pitt!—This topic shall be resumed.